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Abstract
This paper shows that the sufficient statistic approach to the welfare properties
of income (and other) taxes does not easily extend to tax systems with notches,
because with notches, changes in bunching induced by changes in tax rates have
a first-order effect on tax revenues. In an income tax setting, we show that the
marginal excess burden (MEB) of a change in the top rate of tax is given by the
Feldstein (1999) formula for the MEB of a proportional tax, plus a correction term.
These correction terms cannot be calculated just from knowledge of the elasticity
of taxable income and quantitatively, they can be large. An application to VAT
is discussed; with a calibration to UK data, the MEB of the VAT is roughly three
times what is would be if VAT was simply a proportional tax.
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1 Introduction
In a recent survey, Chetty (2009b) argues that an important new development in public
economics is the so-called sufficient statistic approach, which "derives formulas for the
welfare consequences of policies that are functions of high-level elasticities rather than
deep primitives" (Chetty (2009b), p 451). In turn, this means that to assess the welfare
properties of these policies, only these elasticities, rather than fully structural models,
need to be estimated.1
The sufficient statistic approach originated in a seminal paper by Feldstein (1999),
who showed that the marginal excess burden (MEB) of a proportional income tax only
depends on the behavioral responses to the tax via a sufficient statistic, the personal
elasticity of taxable income (ETI). Feldstein’s paper has given rise to a large literature
devoted to obtaining empirical estimates of the ETI (Gruber and Saez (2002), Saez et al.
(2012), Kleven and Schultz (2014), Weber (2014)).
Subsequently, Saez (2001) and Saez et al. (2012) showed that the Feldstein formula for
the MEB could be extended to the top rate of tax in a progressive piece-wise linear income
tax system, and they also established formulae for the revenue and welfare-maximizing
rate of tax. These formulae also have the sufficient statistic feature; specifically, they
depend only on the elasticity of the ETI, a statistic of the income distribution, which
is constant if the top tail of the income distribution is Pareto2, and possibly a welfare
weight.
In this paper, we ask the question as to whether these sufficient statistic properties
of key formulae also extend to tax systems with notches. Generally, a tax notch occurs
when there is a discontinuous change in the tax liability as the tax base varies (Slemrod
(2013), Kleven (2016)).
In practice, we do see notches in several major kinds of taxes, and these are being in-
creasingly studied in the empirical literature. For example, in Pakistan, there are notches
of up to 5% in the personal income tax (Kleven and Waseem (2013)), and in Ireland,
an emergency income levy after the financial crisis had a notch of up to 4% (Hargaden
(2015))3. There are small notches in the federal income tax in the US, and larger notches
induced by income-dependent entitlement to tax credits (Slemrod (2013)). In Germany,
there is a large notch in income tax generated by the Mini-Job program (Tazhitdinova
(2018)). 4
1Chetty (2009a) also argues that this sufficient statistic approach is also valuable in several other
contexts, such as evaluating the welfare gain from social insurance programs, and the welfare effects of
changes in taxes with optimization frictions.
2The formula is that the marginal excess burden equals tea1−t−te , where t is the rate of tax, e is the
personal elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate 1−t, and a is the Pareto parameter.
3From Table 1 of Hargaden (2015), in 2010, earnings of above 26000 Euro incurred a charge of 1040
Euro.
4This is aimed at increasing the labor supply of low-income individuals: earnings below the mini-job
threshold, are exempt from income tax and the employee portion of social security taxes, while earnings
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Notches also exist in other major taxes. For example, notches are, or were until
recently, present in housing transactions taxes in the UK and the US (Best and Kleven
(2013), Kopczuk and Munroe (2015)). They also arise in the corporate income tax in Costa
Rica (Bachas and Soto (2015)). Slemrod (2013) notes that there are many examples of
commodity tax notches, where a marginal change in some characteristic can change the
product classification so as to produce a discrete change in the tax liability.5 Finally, as
argued by Liu and Lockwood (2015), a VAT threshold can be thought of as a tax notch;
a firm’s VAT liability changes discontinuously when its sales go over the registration
threshold. Indeed, given the importance and near-ubiquity of VAT, this is in fact the
most important example of a tax notch.
We first study notches in the income tax setting of Saez (2010) and others, where
households differ in ability or taste so that the disutility of generating taxable income
varies across households. For simplicity, we assume a two-bracket tax i.e. a tax with a
lower rate below a threshold, and a higher rate above. In this setting, our first contribution
is to derive an exact formula for the marginal excess burden (MEB) of the higher rate
of tax, This formula similar to Feldstein (1999)’s formula for the MEB of a proportional
income tax, but includes a correction factor that captures the effect of the bunching
response to an increase in the top rate tax on tax revenue.
The bunching response measures the change in the number of households bunching at
the threshold to avoid paying the top rate of tax, and is thus distinct from the intensive
margin response of taxable income of given household to the tax rate, the elasticity of
taxable income, or ETI. With a notch, unlike the case of a kink, the bunching response
affects tax revenue because with a notch, the tax schedule is discontinuous at the thresh-
old. Specifically, an increase in the top rate of tax increases bunching, which - due to the
notch - lowers tax revenue, and thus raises the MEB.
Moreover, this correction factors depends on an underlying variable C that cannot
be expressed as a simple function of the usual sufficient statistics i.e. the ETI and the
Pareto parameter of the upper tail of the income distribution. It does depend on these
variables, but it also depends on the lower rate of tax, the position of the notch, and a
counterfactual, i.e. the earnings that the individual at the top of the interval (the top
buncher) would choose if faced with the higher rate of tax. So, the sufficient statistic
approach seems to break down with tax notches.
However, all is not lost; we show that the counterfactual earnings of the top buncher
can either be computed theoretically, using the indifference condition that the top buncher
is indifferent between bunching and being above the notch, or, in any empirical study of
bunching, it can be computed empirically, using the estimate of excess mass at the notch
(the parameter B in Kleven and Waseem (2013)). Thus, this paper is the first to show
above the threshold are not.
5For example, in the US, the Gas Guzzler Tax, under which high-performance cars are subject upon
initial sale to a per-vehicle tax that is higher, the lower is the fuel economy of the car.
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how bunching estimates at notches can be used to make welfare calculations.
Of course, if the correction factor turns out to be small, the Feldstein formula still
provides a good approximation to the MEB. Our third contribution is to investigate
whether this is the case. Calibrations show that the percentage error from using the
Feldstein formula for the MEB can be very large. At baseline values, the marginal excess
burden is underestimated by a factor of six 6. So, the conclusion is that at least in the
income tax setting, the sufficient statistic approach is not practical.
We then turn to apply our approach to the VAT, which is the most empirically im-
portant example of a tax notch. We present a simple model of small traders who differ
in productivity, and are subject to VAT at rate t above a threshold level of sales. We
show that this model is formally equivalent to our income tax model, in the sense that
registered firms above the threshold face an effective rate of VAT tR on value-added, and
firms below the threshold face tN , a lower rate 7.
We then show that the MEB of an increase in the statutory rate of VAT is given by the
Feldstein formula for a proportional tax plus a correction factor as in the income tax case.
However, the details of the correction factor are more complex, because an increase in the
statutory rate t increases both the effective rates tR, tN . A calibration of the model shows
that the proportional tax formula for the MEB of the VAT underestimates the true MEB
by a factor of up to three. This framework also allows us to evaluate the effect of increased
compliance costs of VAT in the MEB via its impact on bunching; increased compliance
costs increase bunching and thus increase the MEB, but the effect is quantitatively small
relative to the effect of the notch.
Finally, it should be noted that in this paper, we take all parameters of the tax system,
including the notch, as given, and only vary the top rate of tax. A broader question, to be
addressed in future work, is whether a notch can ever be part of an optimal tax system8.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. After the literature review in
Section 2, in Section 3, we set up the model. Section 4 has the main analytical results for
the income tax, and Section 5 the simulations. Section 6 deals with the extension to the
VAT, and Section 7 concludes.
6We also show that using the formula for the optimal proportional tax substantially overestimates the
true optimal top rate of tax with a notch.
7It may seem counter-intuitive that non-registered firms face a positive rate of effective VAT; this is
because non-registered firms cannot claim back VAT on inputs, so-called "embedded" VAT.
8In the standard Mirrlees framework, where the tax is fully non-linear, this not the case; the optimal
tax schedule is always continuous in income. However, where skills are continuously distributed, and the
government is restricted to a finite number of tax rates, the answer to this question is less obvious. In
fact, Blinder and Rosen (1985) note in the context of subsidies for charitable giving, with heterogenous
tastes, sometimes a notch can improve on a linear subsidy.
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2 Related Literature
This paper speaks to a number of related literatures. First, it is already known that due
to externalities of one kind or another, the sufficient statistic approach has its limitations.
Saez et al. (2012) give the examples of deductibility from income tax of charitable giving
and mortgage interest payments for residential housing. In these cases, an increase
in the marginal rate of tax will boost charity income and home ownership respectively,
which may be valuable objectives in themselves. Saez et al. (2012) call these classical
externalities9.
Fiscal externalities, where the actions of the household generate additional revenue for
the government and thus benefits other households, can also cause the sufficient statistic
approach to fail, or at least require adjustment, but in these cases a simple change to the
formula is sometimes possible. The analysis of income tax evasion of Chetty (2009b) is a
case in point10. As Gillitzer and Slemrod (2016) show, in this case the standard formula for
the marginal efficiency cost of funds can be adjusted in the same way it must be adjusted
for any fiscal externality, i.e. whenever a change in tax rates induces taxpayers to shift
income to another tax. Our results are rather different to these cases of both classical
and fiscal externalities. In our setting, there is no fiscal or other externality- rather, the
sufficient statistic approach fails because the bunching response has a first-order effect on
tax revenue.
A second related literature is on VAT. Here, there are two distinct sets of related pa-
pers. First, there is a growing literature on the effect of VAT thresholds on firm behavior.
Theoretical contributions include Keen and Mintz (2004), Kanbur and Keen (2014) and
Liu and Lockwood (2015), and empirical studies include Liu and Lockwood (2015) and
Harju et al. (2016). The theoretical work of Kanbur, Keen and Mintz focusses on the
optimal threshold of the VAT, holding the rate of tax fixed, and is thus complementary to
this paper, which characterizes the MEB of an increase in the rate, holding the threshold
fixed. In fact, we effectively ask the question of whether it is legitimate to ignore the
threshold altogether when calculating the MEB of the VAT.
Therefore, our paper relates to a literature on the marginal excess burden of indirect
taxes, including VAT (e.g. Ballard et al. (1985), Rutherford and Paltsev (1999)). In these
papers, when the marginal excess burden of VAT is calculated, it is always assumed that
the VAT is a proportional tax i.e. the VAT threshold is ignored. This paper shows that
this simplifying assumption yields seriously biased estimates.
9See Doerrenberg et al. (2015) for a more formal statement of this argument, and estimates of how
deductions respond to tax rate changes for the case of Germany.
10Chetty shows that when the household can evade the personal income tax at a cost, if that cost
is a pure transfer payment i.e. a fine times a probability of detection, there is effectively a positive
fiscal externality of evasion - it generates additional revenue for the government and thus benefit for all
households. In this case, as we might expect, we see that the elasticity of taxable income over-estimates
the excess burden of the tax.
5
A third related literature is that on the MEB and welfare-maximizing taxes with kinks
in the tax schedule. Here, we make a small contribution as a by-product of our main focus,
which is on notches. In the case of kinks, it generally understood that the marginal excess
burden of the top rate of income tax, and the welfare-maximizing top rate depends via
simple formulae, only on the elasticity of the ETI, and the Pareto statistic of the income
distribution. However, there seems to be some confusion about the conditions required
for this result. Saez et al. (2012) suggest that what is required is that assumption that
"behavioral responses take place only along the intensive margin", or more precisely that
the bunching response of an increase in the top rate of tax is of second order relative to
the extensive margin response.11 This assumption is very strong, as even with a kink,
there is always a bunching response. Our Proposition 1 below shows that this assumption
is not necessary, because no matter what the size of the bunching response, the response
has no effect on tax revenue, to first order, as the tax schedule is continuous. All that is
required is that the distribution of taxpayer types is continuous, a standard assumption.
3 The Model and Preliminary Results
3.1 Set-Up
We follow Saez (2010) in our set-up. There are individual taxpayers indexed by a skill
or taste parameter n ∈ [n, n], assumed continuously distributed in the population with
distributionH(n) and density h(n). A type n individual has preferences over consumption
c and taxable income z of the form
u(c, z;n) = c− ψ(z;n)
where ψ(z;n) is the disutility of earning income z. So, as utility is linear in c, we are
assuming away income effects. We also assume:
A1. ψz, ψzz > 0, ψn, ψnz < 0.
A1 says that a higher n represents a higher skill level (i.e. higher wage), or a lower taste
for leisure. In particular, the higher n, the lower the total and marginal disutility of
generating a given amount of taxable income. Assumption A1 is satisfied for example, by
the iso-elastic specification of Saez (2010):
ψ(z;n) =
n
1 + 1
e
( z
n
)1+ 1
e (1)
11Specifically, they say the following. "The change dt could induce a small fraction dN of the N
taxpayers to leave (or join if dt < 0) the top bracket. As long as behavioral responses take place only
along the intensive margin, each individual response is proportional to dt so that the total revenue effect
of such responses is second order (dN.dt ) and hence can be ignored in our derivation."
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The budget constraint is c = z−T (z), where T (.) is the tax function. So, a household’s
utility over z is u(z;n) = z − T (z)− ψ(z;n).
Finally, for future reference, define the optimal taxable income at tax rate t for a type
n taxpayer to be;
z(1− t, n) ≡ arg max
z
{(1− t)z − ψ(z;n)}
Note from A1 that z1−t, zn > 0, where subscripts denote derivatives. So, z1−t is the
response of taxable income to the net-of-tax rate. Following Saez et al. (2012), we call
this the intensive margin response to the tax.
3.2 Kinks and Notches
For simplicity, we focus on a two-bracket tax, although our arguments apply straightfor-
wardly to the case of the highest tax in a piecewise-linear tax system with any number
of brackets. We will assume that the tax system is progressive; that is, the tax rate on
incomes in the higher income bracket is strictly greater than the tax on incomes in the
lower income bracket.
So, with a two-bracket tax, for a kink, the tax function is
TK(z) =
{
tLz, z ≤ z0
tLz0 + tH(z − z0), z > z0
(2)
for z0 > 0, tH > tL ≥ 0; that is, all income below the kink point z0 is taxed at the lower
rate tL, and all income in excess of the kink is taxed at the higher rate. For a notch, the
tax function is
TN(z) =
{
tLz, z ≤ z0
tHz, z > z0
(3)
with tH > tL ≥ 0. That is, when taxable income is below z0, a tax at rate tL is paid on
all income, but when tH is above z0, a tax at rate tH is paid on all income.
3.3 Bunching
With either a kink or a notch, all types in an interval n ∈ [nL, nH ] will bunch at taxable
income z0. In both cases, the lowest type who bunches is the one who is just willing to
earn taxable income z0 at the lower tax rate. So, nL is defined by the condition
z(1− tL, nL) = z0 (4)
With a kink, the highest type who bunches, nH , is defined by the condition that the
optimal choice of taxable income at tax tH is just z0 i.e.
z(1− tH ;nH) ≡ z0 (5)
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With a notch, nH is defined by the condition that the nH type must be indifferent
between staying at the notch and paying tax tL, and choosing z optimally, and paying
tH on all income . To write this indifference condition, we first define the indirect utility
function
v(t;n) ≡ max
z
{(1− t)z − ψ(z;n)}
Then, the condition defining nH can be written:
(1− tL)z0 − ψ(z0;nH) ≡ v(tH ;nH) (6)
The left-hand side of (6) is utility when taxable income is constrained to be at the notch
value z0. Note that this indifference condition implies z(1 − tH , nH) > z0, because if
z(1 − tH , nH) < z0, the nH−type could choose z optimally and stay below the notch.
Note the difference between indifference condition (6) and the condition (5).
3.4 The Bunching Response
Here, we study the effect of a change in tH on the mass of individuals who bunch i.e. on
the size of the interval [nL, nH ]. Note first from (4) that nL is unaffected by tH for both
a kink and a notch. Next, in the kink case, we can calculate from (5) note that
∂nH
∂tH
=
z1−tH
zn
> 0 (7)
So, we have a bunching response to an increase in tH : i.e. an increase in the tax rate
above the kink makes going above the kink less attractive, and so more people bunch
below the kink.
In the notch case, note that vt = −z, where vt is the derivative of v with respect to
t. Then, we can calculate from (6) that
∂nH
∂tH
=
z(1− tH , nH)
ψn(z0;nH)− ψn(z(1− tH , nH);nH) (8)
Also, as ψnz(z;n) < 0 and z(1 − tH , nH) > z0, we see that the denominator of (8) is
positive, and consequently from (8):
∂nH
∂tH
> 0 (9)
So, again we see that there is a bunching response to a change in tH ; an increase in the
tax rate above the notch makes going above the notch less attractive, and so more people
bunch at the notch.
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4 Main Results
4.1 The Effect of the Bunching Response on Tax Revenue
Here, we establish a key result that the effect of the bunching response on tax revenue
with a kink and a notch are qualitatively different, being zero and negative respectively.
With a kink, revenue can be written
R = tL
(ˆ nL
n
z(1− tL;n)h(n)dn+
ˆ n
nL
z0h(n)dn
)
+ tH
(ˆ n
nH
(z(1− tH ;n)− z0)h(n)dn
)
(10)
Note that all households with n ≥ nL pay tax at the lower rate on the first z0 of earnings.
In the kink case, the bunching effect on tax revenue i.e. the effect of a change in tH on
R via a change in nH in tH is, from (10):
∂R
∂nH
= −tH(z(1− tH ;nH)− z0)h(nH) = 0 (11)
So, overall, with a kink, the effect of the bunching response on tax revenue is zero. This
is simply due to the fact that a kinked tax schedule is continuous in z.
With a notch, revenue is
R = tL
(ˆ nL
n
z(1− tL;n)h(n)dn+
ˆ nH
nL
z0h(n)dn
)
+tH
(ˆ n
nH
z(1− tH ;n)h(n)dn
)
(12)
Comparing this to (10), we see a key difference. Because the higher rate applies to all
income for those earning above z0, the threshold z0 no longer enters into the the tax base
for tH , and so the upper limit of integration on z0 in the tax base for tL falls from n to
nH , reflecting the fact that now only individuals below nH pay any tax at the lower rate.
Note from (12) that;
∂R
∂nH
= (tLz0 − tHz(1− tH ;nH))h(nH) < 0 (13)
This is strictly negative as tH > tL, z(1−tH ;nH) > z0. So, in contrast to the kink case, the
bunching effect on tax revenue R from an increase in tH is negative, as ∂nH∂tH > 0 from (9).
This is because a small increase in nH has two effects on revenue that are both negative.
First, there is a discontinuity in the tax base; the earnings of these who now locate at the
notch fall discontinuously from z(1− tH ;nH) to z0. Second, there is a discontinuity in the
tax rate applying to that base; all these earnings are taxed at a lower rate, tL rather than
tH .
So, we conclude:
Proposition 1. The effect of the bunching response on tax revenue is zero for a kink,
but strictly negative for a notch.
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This result is the key one that drives the rest of the paper. So, to fully appreciate
the intuition, we consider the two following figures. Each Figure shows how tax revenue
collected from an n-type household varies with n. To make the figures as clear as possible,
we assume iso-elastic utility as in (1), in which case it is easily verified that tax revenue
collected from an n-type household is linear in n. In both Figures 1 and 2, the tax revenue
as a function of n before the change is shown by the red line. Note that for n between nL
and nH , households are bunching and so revenue is constant.
Now suppose that tH increases. In Figure 1, the green line shows the hypothetical
revenue paid by households above nH following the increase if there were no behavioral
response; all households above nH pay more, proportionally to n. The green arrow shows
the bunching response; some households move from above the threshold to just below.
From this figure, it is clear that this has only a second-order effect on tax revenue; the
government loses just the small triangle shown.
Figure 1: The Effect of the Bunching Response on Tax Revenue with A Kink
n 
Tax revenue  
nL nH
Figure 2 below shows the same change in the top rate of tax, but for a notched tax.
With a notch, there is a discrete increase in the tax liability above the notch. When
the top rate of tax tH increases, as before, the green arrow shows the bunching response;
some households move from above the threshold to just below. But now, it is clear that
this change causes a first-order drop in tax revenue, as shown by the grey square; this is
because tax revenue as a function of n is discontinuous at this point.
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Figure 2: The Effect of the Bunching Response on Tax Revenue with A Notch
n 
Tax revenue 
nL nH
Finally, the result that the bunching response on tax revenue is zero for a kink also
helps to clarify some confusion in the literature. As already noted, Saez et al. (2012)
argue that for sufficient statistic formulae to apply in the kink case, what is required is
that assumption that "behavioral responses take place only along the intensive margin",
or more precisely that the bunching response of an increase in the top rate of tax is of
second order relative to the extensive margin response. Proposition 1 shows that this
assumption is not required, because no matter how large is ∂nH
∂tH
, ∂R
∂nH
= 0 in the kink case.
4.2 The Marginal Excess Burden
Here, we derive a formula for the marginal excess burden (MEB) of tH when there is a
notch and show that it can be written as the MEB of a proportional tax plus a correction
factor. To define the MEB, note that due to quasi-linearity, the natural measure of
welfare is the integral of indirect utilities, say W, plus revenue R, which is assumed to be
redistributed as a lump-sum back to households when calculating the MEB. So,
MEB = −d(W +R)/dtH
dR/dtH
(14)
The minus sign ensures that the marginal excess burden is measured as a positive number.
From (12), we see that the effect of an increase in tH on tax revenue is:
dR
dtH
= BH +
tH
∂BH
∂tH
∣∣∣∣
nH const︸ ︷︷ ︸+
∂R
∂nH
∂nH
∂tH︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive-margin bunching
(15)
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Here
BH =
ˆ n
nH
z(1− tH ;n)h(n)dn (16)
is the base in which the higher rate of tax is levied.
So, (15) is composed of three terms, the mechanical effect BH , and two behavioral
effects on tax revenue, the intensive-margin and bunching effects. The intensive-margin
effect on tax revenue is standard; it describes how tax revenue changes because of changes
in earnings, conditional on the taxpayer staying the same tax bracket. The bunching
effect on tax revenue and its impact on the marginal excess burden is the focus of our
investigation.
To compute dW/dtH , note first that the integral of indirect utilities is
W =
ˆ nL
n
v(1− tL;n)h(n)dn+
ˆ nH
nL
(z0(1− tL)−ψ(z0;n))h(n)dn+
ˆ n
nH
v(1− tH ;n)h(n)dn
(17)
By definition, a small change in nH has no effect on welfare, because nH is defined by (6)
above. So, using vt = −z, we see that
dW
dtH
= −
ˆ n
nH
z(1− tH ;n)h(n)dn = −BH (18)
So, plugging (15), (18) back into (14), dividing through by BH , multiplying by 1− tH ,
and noting that holding nH constant, ∂BH∂(1−tH) = −
∂BH
∂tH
, we see that
MEB =
tHe+ C
1− tH − tHe+ C , C = −
1− tH
BH
∂R
∂nH
∂nH
∂tH
(19)
Here,
e =
1− tH
BH
∂BH
∂(1− tH)
∣∣∣∣
nH const
=
1− tH
BH
ˆ n
nH
∂z(1− tH ;n)
∂(1− tH) h(n)dn (20)
is the intensive-margin elasticity of the tax base BH with respect to the net of tax rate 1−
tH , and C is a correction factor, which captures the effect of a changing nH , the bunching
response, on the MEB, via its effect on revenue. Of course, given the specification (1), e
is a constant independent of nH .
We can then prove 12;
12This and subsequent Propositions are proved in the Appendix.
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Proposition 2. Assume iso-elastic utility (1), and that the distribution of n is Pareto,
with shape and scale parameters a, n. Then, the MEB with a notch is
MEB =
tHe+ C
1− tH − tHe− C , (21)
where
C =
(tH − tLz0/z˜H)(a− 1)(1 + e)
1−
(
z0
z˜H
)(1+e)/e > 0. (22)
Moreover, in (22), and z˜H = nH(1− tH)e and nH is defined by (6).
Some comments are appropriate at this point. First, the MEB (21) is the formula for
the marginal excess burden of a proportional income tax, as shown by Feldstein (1999),
plus the correction factor C. This is intuitive; all households above nH are paying tax at
rate tH on all their income, so for these households, tH is indeed a proportional tax. So,
as already remarked, the correction factor C just captures the effect of a changing nH ,
the bunching response, on the MEB, via its effect on revenue.
Second, we can ask how the MEB compares to the MEB in a kinked tax system. As
shown for example, by Saez (2001), the latter is
MEBK =
tHea
1− tH − tHea
Clearly, MEBK depends only on simple sufficient statistics; other than the tax rate tH ,
it depends only on e, the intensive-margin elasticity of taxable income, and a, the shape
parameter of the income distribution.
By contrast, from (22), it is clear that C is a more complex object. It depends not
only on sufficient statistics e, a, and the top rate of tax, tH , but also on other parameters
of the tax system tL, z0, and on z˜H , which is the unconstrained earnings of the type nH ,
given that they face the higher rate of tax.
So, there are two ways of solving for C. One is simply to compute C using the
formulae (22), (6), choosing calibrated values for e, a, z0, and that is what we do in this
paper. Alternatively, as shown by Kleven and Waseem (2013), in any empirical study of
a notch, the earnings nH(1 − tL)e can be estimated. Specifically, nH(1 − tL)e is simply
z∗ + ∆z∗ in the notation of their paper, where z∗ is the earnings notch and as explained
there, ∆z∗/z∗ can be estimated from excess bunching at the notch. Given this, z˜H can
be recovered simply by multiplying z∗ + ∆z∗ by (1− tH)e/(1− tL)e.
5 Simulations
We have seen that the MEB of an increase in tH is given by the corresponding formula
for a proportional tax tH plus a correction factor, C. Moreover, the MEB formula for a
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proportional tax is very simple, depending only on the intensive-margin elasticity e, and
thus can easily be calculated.
So, a key question is whether we can get a good approximation to MEB by setting
C = 0 i.e. treating tH as a proportional tax. In this section, we investigate whether the
MEB calculated assuming that tH is a proportional tax, is a good approximation to the
true MEB.
To do this, we need to calibrate the model. In particular, we require values for
e, a, tH , tL, and z0. Our baseline parameter values are chosen as follows. Following Piketty
and Saez (2013), we set a = 1.5, and following Saez et al. (2012) and Kleven and Schultz
(2014), we set e = 0.25. Regarding the tax rates, we first set tL = 0.2, which is broadly in
line with the average income and payroll tax paid by US households13. It is also the basic
rate of income tax in the UK. For the notch, we use the fact that notches in personal
income tax, where they exist, are small. For example, Kleven and Waseem (2013) show
that in the Pakistani income tax, the notch ranges between 2 and 5 percentage points.
So, we will take our baseline notch tH − tL = ∆t = 0.03.
To choose n, z0 we assume that only the top 20% of the population pay a higher rate of
income tax, roughly the proportion in the UK. Define n0 to be the skill level corresponding
to taxable income just at the notch i.e. n0(1 − tL)e = z0. This requires that 80% of the
population have skills below n0 i.e. H (n0) = 1−
(
n
n0
)α
= 0.8, or n
n0
= (0.2)1/1.5 = 0.342.
Given that only the ratio n
n0
is determined, we set n = 1, so n0 = 2.924. But then
z0 = 2.924(0.8)
0.25 = 2.168.
Finally, from (22), we need a value for nH . Under the assumption (1), the indifference
condition (6) reduces to
e(nH)
−1/e (z0)
1+ 1
e + nH(1− tH)1+e − (1− tL)z0(1 + e) = 0 (23)
Equation (23) has two roots, and we take the larger root to ensure that nH(1 − tL)e >
z0. Finally, parameter values are chosen so that the denominator in (21) is positive, which
is equivalent to dR/dtH > 0 i.e. that the tax rate is on the right side of the Laffer curve.
This requires simply that the notch is greater than 0.0015.14
Figures 3, 4 show both the true MEB, as given by (21), and the approximation, treating
tH as a proportional tax i.e. setting C = 0 in (21). The former is denoted by MEB in
the Figures, and the latter by MEBA.
The error in using MEBA at the baseline values can be read off from Figure 3, setting
e = 0.25. It can be seen that true MEB is about 0.6, whereas the approximation is about
0.1. So, the error in using the proportional formula is about a factor of six. Figure 3 also
13"Overview Of The Federal Tax System As In Effect For 2015", Joint Committee on Taxation,
Congress of the United States.
14For the denominator in (21) to be positive, we require 1 − tH(1 + e) > C, which is satisfied for
tH − tL > 0.0015.
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Figure 3: MEB as e varies
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Figure 4: MEB as a varies
shows that MEB is increasing in e, at a faster rate than MEBA, so when e = 0.4 for
example, the error in using MEBA is almost an order of magnitude.
Figure 4 shows thatMEB is also increasing in a, the Pareto parameter which measures
(inversely) the size of the tail of the income distribution. As MEBA is independent of
a, this means that the the error in using MEBA is increasing in a.
6 An Application to VAT
6.1 The Set-Up
As remarked in the introduction, perhaps the most important example of a tax notch is
the value-added tax. In this section, we present a simple model of value-added tax, based
on Liu and Lockwood (2015), which is mathematically equivalent to the model developed
above. We then calibrate the model using UK data from Liu and Lockwood (2015), to
estimate the MEB from the VAT, taking into account bunching at the threshold.
Consider a single industry with a fixed, large number of small traders producing a
homogeneous good. Each small trader combines his own labor input l with an intermediate
input x to produce output y via a fixed coefficients technology
y = min
{
l,
x
γ
}
, (24)
where γ measures the the input requirement per unit of output. In particular, for all
traders, to produce one unit of output requires γ units of input.
Individual traders are indexed by a skill or taste parameter m ∈ [m,m], assumed
continuously distributed in the population with distribution H(m) and density h(m). A
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trader of type m has an overall payoff of
u(l;m) = pi − ψ(l;m), ψ(l;m) = Am
1 + 1
e
(
l
m
)1+ 1
e
(25)
where pi is profit and ψ(l;m) is the disutility of labour. So, traders are differentiated
by disutility of labor. This assumption is not essential, but facilitates comparison to the
income tax case.15
For simplicity, it is assumed that traders only sell to final consumers, who have per-
fectly elastic demand for the good at price p = 1. This is analogous to the assumption
made in the taxable income literature that the wage is fixed, i.e. labor demand is per-
fectly elastic at a fixed wage. Finally, the intermediate input is produced only from labor
supplied by non-trader households via a fixed-coefficients technology where one unit of
labor is needed to produce one unit of the intermediate input. So, the tax-exclusive price
of the output is w, the wage, which we also assume to be 1.
The traders and the producer of the intermediate inputs face a VAT system. It is
assumed that the producer is VAT-registered. If the trader is registered, he must charge
VAT on sales y at rate t, but can claim back any VAT paid on inputs. The trader must
register for VAT if the value of sales y exceeds the threshold y0, but can register voluntarily
even if y < y0.
Note that when not registered, the price of the input is 1 + t. So, the profit for the
non-registered trader is
piN = (1− γ(1 + t))y. (26)
where γ is the cost of inputs relative to revenue per unit sold. For the registered trader,
we reason as follows. This trader must charge VAT on his output. None of the output
VAT can be passed on to the buyer, as he has perfectly elastic demand. So, revenue per
unit sold is p/(1 + t). But, if the trader is registered, he can claim back VAT on the input
use x, so the price of the input is w. So, overall, the profit for the registered trader is
piR =
(
1
1 + t
− γ
)
y. (27)
We now assume, to make the analysis interesting, that 1 > γ(1 + t). From (26), this
ensures that non-registered firms make a positive profit. Also, it ensures that for a given
value of sales y, piN > piR, so there is no voluntary registration. This is important because
then the VAT threshold functions exactly like a tax notch.
15For example, m could enter into the production function, (24) instead.
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6.2 Effective VAT Rates
Now define n ≡ m(1 − γ). Then, substituting (26), (27) into (25), after some rearrange-
ment, we can show that the payoff of trader n can be written as a function of value-added
z = y(1− γ) and the VAT system as follows;
u(z;n) = z − T (z)− A
(1− γ)
n
1 + 1
e
( z
n
)1+ 1
e (28)
where
T (z) =
{
tNz, z ≤ z0
tRz, z > z0
, tR =
t
(1 + t)(1− γ) , tN =
γt
1− γ . (29)
As A is a free parameter, we set it equal to 1− γ. Then, (28), (29) describe a utility
function and a tax schedule as function of Z that are mathematically equivalent to the
income tax model - although, obviously, the economic interpretation of z is different. Here,
tN , tR are the effective tax rates faced by non-registered and registered traders respectively
on the value-added they generate. Obviously, both effective rates are increasing in the
statutory rate, t. Also, note that both rates are increasing in input intensity γ. Moreover,
from our assumption 1 > (1 + t)γ, tR > tN .
So, faced with the tax schedule (29), all traders in the interval n ∈ [nL, nR] will bunch
at the VAT threshold z0. Moreover, nL = z0/(1 − tN)e, and nR solves (23) with tH , tL
replaced by tR, tN .
Finally, letting z(1− t;n) be the value-added chosen by an unconstrained firm facing
tax t, it can be shown that the revenue from the VAT is as in (12), with tH , tL replaced
by tR, tN i.e.
R = tN
(ˆ nN
n
z(1− tN ;n)h(n)dn+
ˆ nR
nN
z0h(n)dn
)
+tR
(ˆ n
nR
z(1− tR;n)h(n)dn
)
(30)
In (30), the base on which tN is levied is the value-added of non-registered traders, and
the base of tR is the value-added of registered traders.
6.3 The Marginal Excess Burden of the VAT
With the VAT, a change in the statutory rate t of VAT will change both effective tax
rates tN , tR unless γ = 0 i.e. no intermediate inputs are used. This is of course, analogous
to a reform that changes both tH and tL in the income tax model. So, for the VAT,
the formula for the MEB becomes somewhat more complex. To present the formula
for the MEB in this case, we need a few more definitions. First, note from (30), using
z(1− t);n) = (1− t)en, the effective bases of tN and tR are
BN =
ˆ nN
n
(1− tN)enh(n)dn+ z0(H(nR)−H(nN)), BR =
ˆ n
nR
(1− tR)enh(n)dn (31)
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Then, from (31), the intensive-margin elasticities of BR, BN with respect to the net-of-tax
rate are
1− tR
BR
∂BR
∂tR
∣∣∣∣
nR const
= e,
1− tN
BN
∂BN
∂(1− tN)
∣∣∣∣
nN const
= eφ, (32)
where
φ =
´ nN
n
z(1− tN ;n)h(n)dn
BN
< 1 (33)
The term φ captures a new effect of bunching; with bunching, a mass H(nR) − H(nN)
of the non-registered firms that are bunching are unresponsive to a change in the rate
of VAT, which lowers the aggregate intensive-margin elasticity of the tax base BN with
respect to tN .16
Moreover, recall that an increase in t causes both tN and tR to increase, so
θ =
BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
+ BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
(34)
measures the importance of a change in tR on revenue relative to tN . Armed with these
new definitions, we can state our result.
Proposition 4. Assume that the distribution of sales (and pretax-income) is Pareto, with
shape and scale parameters a, n. Then, the MEB of the VAT is
MEB =
τε+ C
1− τ(1 + ε)− C (35)
where
τ = (1− θ)tN + θtR, ε = (1− θ)tNφ+ θtR
(1− θ)tN + θtR e (36)
and finally the correction factor is
C = −
∂R
∂nR
(
∂nR
∂tN
∂tN
∂t
+ ∂nR
∂tR
∂tR
∂t
)
BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
+ BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
(37)
So, we note now that bunching impacts the calculation of the MEB in two ways. First,
as before, there is a correction factor C in (35). The correction factor is more complex
than in the income tax case. The reason for the additional complexity is clear from (37);
an increase in t now increases both tR, tN and in turn, both of these effective taxes affect
nR, the top of the bunching interval, and thus revenue. An explicit formula for C in terms
of parameters can be derived as in (22) above; this is done in the Appendix.
In addition, there is a second, new effect of bunching in (36). Bunching dampens the
16A similar point has been noted before by Slemrod et al. (1994) and Apps et al. (2014) who consider the
design of a two-bracket income tax. Because the tax system studied is kinked, not notched, the formula
for the optimal lower rate of tax depends only on the intensive margin elasticity, but this elasticity is
dampened by the fact that taxpayers at the kink do not adjust their behavior in response to the tax.
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intensive-margin response to a change in t, because at a fixed nN , nR, firms in this interval
will not adjust their sales in response to a change in t. This is captured by the term φ > 0,
which lowers the intensive margin response from e to ε.
An interesting special case is where the small traders do not use any intermediate
input, so i.e. γ = 0. Then from (29), tN = 0, tR = t1+t = τ, so (35) simplifies to
MEB =
t
1+t
e+ C
1− t
1+t
(1 + e)− C (38)
It can be checked that in this case, C is given by the explicit formula (22), replacing
tH , tL by tR, 0 respectively.17
6.4 Simulations
Here we calibrate the VAT model, and plot the true MEB in (35) and an approximation
to the MEB as parameters vary 18. The approximation is the one treating VAT as a
proportional tax i.e. setting C = 0 in (38), which gives
MEBA =
t
1+t
e
1− t
1+t
(1 + e)
The parameters are calibrated as follows. In the UK, the statutory rate of VAT is
20%, so t = 0.2. Liu and Lockwood (2016) calculate that for the universe of firms in the
UK that file a corporate tax return, γ = 0.45. This gives tN = 0.16, tR = 0.30.
Next, define n0 to be the productivity level corresponding to turnover just at the
threshold i.e. n0(1− tN)e = z0. From Liu and Lockwood (2015), 62.5% of firms are below
the threshold. So, n
n0
must satisfy H (n0) = 1 −
(
n
n0
)1.2
= 0.625, or n
n0
= (0.375)1/1.2 =
0.442. Given that only the ratio n
n0
is determined, we set n = 1, so n0 = 2.26. But then
z0 = 2.53(0.84)
0.25 = 2.164.
Finally, we need a value for a. A prior question is whether the "upper tail" of the
distribution of firm sales y is well-described by a Pareto distribution. In the case of
personal incomes, a Pareto distribution of the upper tail is widely accepted, but less is
known about firms. In the US, there is evidence that the size distribution of firms as
measured by sales is Pareto (Luttmer (2007)), and Luttmer estimates a value for the US
of a = 1.06. In the Online Appendix, I provide evidence that this is also the case for the
UK, using firm sales from administrative data on corporate tax returns. I show that for
firms above the VAT threshold, the estimate a is about 1.2. So, this is the figure we will
use in the simulations.
17If there is no bunching i.e. if tN = tR, then φ = 1, C = 0, so MEB = τe1−τ(1+e) . But this requires
that τ = 1, so in this case, z → 0. Also, before this point, 1− τ(1+ e) < 0, so this case is not interesting.
18The details of the calibration are described in the Online Appendix.
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Our results are given in Figures 5-8 below. Figures 5 and 6 show the simpler case with
no intermediate inputs i.e. γ = 0, in which case we know that formula (35) reduces to
formula (38).
Figure 5: MEB of VAT as e varies,
γ = 0.0
Figure 6: MEB of VAT as a varies,
γ = 0.0
We can see that at the baseline figures for the parameters e.g. e = 0.25 in Figure
5, the true MEB is about twice as high as the approximation. This difference is much
smaller than in the income tax case, and is driven partly by the lower value of a in the
VAT case. Indeed, we can see in Figure 8 that the accuracy of the approximation MEBA
falls rapidly as a rises, because MEB is increasing in a whereas MEBA is independent
of a.
Figure 7: MEB of VAT as e varies,
γ = 0.45
Figure 8: MEB of VAT as a varies,
γ = 0.45
Figures 7, 8 below show the more realistic case with γ = 0.45. Here, we see that the
difference between the true MEB and the approximation is somewhat higher; the true
MEB is about 3 times higher than the approximation. As in the case with no inputs, the
true MEB is increasing in both e and a.
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7 Conclusions
This paper shows that the sufficient statistic approach to the welfare properties of in-
come (and other) taxes does not easily extend to tax systems with notches, because with
notches, changes in bunching induced by changes in tax rates have a first-order effect on
tax revenues. In an income tax setting, we showed that the MEB of a change in the
top rate of tax is given by the Feldstein (1999) formula for the MEB of a proportional
tax, plus a correction term. Also, under certain conditions, the optimal top rate of tax
is given by the formula for the optimal proportional tax, minus a correction term. These
correction terms can be computed empirically, using an estimate of excess mass at the
notch. Quantitatively, these correction terms can be very large.
An application to VAT was also discussed. A simple model of small traders who
differ in productivity, and are subject to VAT at rate t above a threshold level of sales
was shown to be formally equivalent to the income tax model. We showed that the
MEB of an increase in the statutory rate of VAT is given by the Feldstein formula for a
proportional tax plus a correction factor as in the income tax case. With a calibration
to UK data, the MEB of the VAT is roughly three times what is would be if VAT was
simply a proportional tax.
21
References
Apps, Patricia, Ngo Long, and Ray Rees, “Optimal piecewise linear income taxa-
tion,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2014, 16 (4), 523–545.
Bachas, Pierre and Mauricio Soto, “Not (ch) your average tax system: corporate
taxation under weak enforcement,” Unpublished manuscript, 2015.
Ballard, Charles L, John B Shoven, and John Whalley, “The total welfare cost of
the United States tax system: a general equilibrium approach,” National Tax Journal,
1985, pp. 125–140.
Best, Michael and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, “Housing Market Responses to Trans-
action Taxes: Evidence from Notches and Stimulus in the UK,” Memeo, London School
of Economics 2013.
Blinder, Alan S and Harvey S Rosen, “Notches,” The American Economic Review,
1985, 75 (4), 736–747.
Chetty, Raj, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss?
The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance,” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, August 2009, 1 (2), 31–52.
, “Sufficient statistics for welfare analysis: A bridge between structural and reduced-
form methods,” Annu. Rev. Econ., 2009, 1 (1), 451–488.
Doerrenberg, Philipp, Andreas Peichl, and Sebastian Siegloch, “The elasticity of
taxable income in the presence of deduction possibilities,” Journal of Public Economics,
2015.
Feldstein, Martin, “Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1999, 81 (4), 674–680.
Gillitzer, Christian and Joel Slemrod, “Does Evasion Invalidate the Welfare Suffi-
ciency of the ETI?,” The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, 16 (4).
Gruber, Jon and Emmanuel Saez, “The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and
implications,” Journal of public Economics, 2002, 84 (1), 1–32.
Hargaden, Enda Patrick, “Taxpayer Responses over the Cycle: Evidence from Irish
Notches,” 2015.
Harju, Jarkko, Tuomas Matikka, and Timo Rauhanen, “The Effects of Size-Based
Regulation on Small Firms: Evidence from Vat Threshold,” Working Paper 75, VATT
Institute for Economic Research June 2016.
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen, “Thresholds, Informality, and Partitions of Com-
pliance,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2014, 21 (4), 536–559.
Keen, Michael and Jack Mintz, “The Optimal Threshold for a Value-Added Tax,”
Journal of Public Economics, 2004, 88 (3-4), 559–576.
Kleven, Henrik, “Bunching,” Annual Review of Economics, 2016, 8.
22
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen and Esben Anton Schultz, “Estimating taxable income
responses using Danish tax reforms,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
2014, 6 (4), 271–301.
and Mazhar Waseem, “Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Struc-
tural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 2013, 128 (2), 669–723.
Kopczuk, Wojciech and David Munroe, “Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes
on the Residential Real Estate Market,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
May 2015, 7 (2), 214–57.
Liu, Li and Ben Lockwood, “VAT Notches,” Discussion Papers 10606, CEPR May
2015.
Luttmer, Erzo GJ, “Selection, growth, and the size distribution of firms,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2007, 122 (3), 1103–1144.
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez, “Optimal Labor Income Taxation,” Handbook
of Public Economics, 2013, 5, 391.
Rutherford, Thomas and Sergey Paltsev, “From an input-output table to a general
equilibrium model: assessing the excess burden of indirect taxes in Russia,” Draft,
University of Colorado, 1999.
Saez, Emmanuel, “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 2001, 68 (1), 205–229.
, “Do taxpayers bunch at kink points?,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
2010, 2 (3), 180–212.
, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect
to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2012, 50
(1), 3–50.
Slemrod, Joel, “Buenas notches: lines and notches in tax system design,” eJournal of
Tax Research, 2013, 11 (3), 259.
, Shlomo Yitzhaki, Joram Mayshar, and Michael Lundholm, “The optimal
two-bracket linear income tax,” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 53 (2), 269–290.
Tazhitdinova, Alisa, “Does the Magnitude of Incentives Matter? Labor Supply and
Demand Responses to an Unusually Large Tax Break,” 2018.
Weber, Caroline E, “Toward obtaining a consistent estimate of the elasticity of taxable
income using difference-in-differences,” Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 117, 90–103.
23
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. It remains to derive a formula for C. From (8), noting that
ψn = −1
e
n−(1+1/e)
1 + 1
e
(z)1+
1
e = − 1
1 + e
( z
n
)1+1/e
. (A.1)
and z(1− t;n) = (1− t)en, we have
∂nH
∂tH
=
(1− tH)enH(1 + e)
(1− tH)1+e −
(
z0
nH
)1+1/e (A.2)
Next, from (13) and (16), using the fact that z(1− t;n) = (1− t)en, we have
1
BH
∂R
∂nH
=
(tLz0 − tHz(1− tH ;nH))h(nH)´ n
nH
z(1− tH ;n)h(n)dn
(A.3)
=
(tLz0 − tH(1− tH)enH)h(nH)
(1− tH)e
´ n
nH
nh(n)dn
So, plugging (A.2),(A.3) into (N.6), we have:
C =
(1− tH)(tH(1− tH)enH − tLz0)h(nH)
(1− tH)e
´ n
nH
nh(n)dn
(1− tH)enH(1 + e)
(1− tH)1+e −
(
z0
nH
)1+1/e (A.4)
=
(1− tH)(tH(1− tH)enH − tLz0)
(1− tH)eE[n |n ≥ nH ]
h(nH)
(1−H(nH))
nH(1 + e)
(1− tH)1+e −
(
z0
nH
)1+1/e
where in the second line we have used
´ n
nH
nh(n)dn = E[n |n ≥ nH ] (1−H(nH)) .
Now, given that n follows a Pareto distribution with shape and scale parameters a, n,
we also know that
E[n |n ≥ nH ] = anH
a− 1 ,
h(n)
1−H(n) =
a
n
(A.5)
Plugging (A.5) into (A.4), we get:
C =
(1− tH)(tH(1− tH)e − tLz0/nH)(a− 1)(1 + e)(
(1− tH)1+e −
(
z0
nH
)1+1/e) (A.6)
Then, using the definition z˜H = nH(1 − tH)e in (A.6), and rearranging, we get (22) as
required. 
Derivation of (28), (29), (30). We first derive (28), (29). Trader utility is profit minus
the disutility of labour. So, combining (A.1), (26), (27) and using n = m(1 − γ), l = y,
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get:
uN = (1− γ(1 + t))y − A
1− γ
n
1 + 1
e
(
y(1− γ)
n
)1+ 1
e
(A.7)
uR =
(
1
1 + t
− γ
)
y − A
1− γ
n
1 + 1
e
(
y(1− γ)
n
)1+ 1
e
Now, using z = y(1− γ) in (A.7), we get
uN =
1− γ(1 + t)
1− γ z −
A
1− γ
n
1 + 1
e
( z
n
)1+ 1
e (A.8)
uR =
(
1
(1 + t)(1− γ) −
γ
1− γ
)
z − A
1− γ
n
1 + 1
e
( z
n
)1+ 1
e
Finally, we note that for (A.8) to imply (29), we require
1− tN = 1− γ(1 + t)
1− γ , 1− tR =
1
(1 + t)(1− γ) −
γ
1− γ (A.9)
But, solving (A.9) for tN , tR, we get (29) as required.
Now we derive (30). Let y(n) be the sales of an n-type trader. Then, revenue from
the from the VAT is
R =
t
1 + t
ˆ n
nR
y(n)h(n)dn+ t
ˆ nR
n
γy(n)h(n)dn (A.10)
The first term is revenue from VAT levied on the value of sales of registered firms, because
the sale price is 1/(1 + t), and the second term is revenue from inputs sold by the inter-
mediate input producer to firms that do not register for VAT. Using z(n) = y(n)(1− γ),
we can write this as
R =
t
(1 + t)(1− γ)
ˆ n
nR
z(n)h(n)dn+
tγ
1− γ
ˆ nR
n
z(n)h(n)dn (A.11)
Finally, replacing z(n) by z(1− tN ;n), z0, or z(1− tR;n) where appropriate, we get (30)
as required. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let BN , BR be the bases of the effective taxes tN , tR defined in
(31). Then from (17),(30), and remembering that a change in the statutory rate of VAT
t changes tN , tR via (29), we have:
dW
dt
= −
(
∂tN
∂t
BN +
∂tR
∂t
BR
)
(A.12)
dR
dt
=
∂tN
∂t
(
BN + tN
∂BN
∂tN
∣∣∣∣
nR const
)
+
∂tR
∂t
(
BR + tR
∂BR
∂tR
∣∣∣∣
nR const
)
− C ′ (A.13)
where
C ′ = − ∂R
∂nR
(
∂tN
∂t
∂nR
∂tN
+
∂tR
∂t
∂nR
∂tR
)
(A.14)
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So, plugging (A.12),(A.13) into (14), we have, after rearrangement
MEB = −d(W +R)/dt
dR/dt
(A.15)
=
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
tN
(
1−tN
BN
∂BN
∂(1−tN )
∣∣∣
nR const
)
+ BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
tR
(
1−tR
BR
∂BR
∂(1−tR)
∣∣∣
nR const
)
+ C ′
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
(
1− tN − tN 1−tNBN
∂BN
∂tN
∣∣∣
nR const
)
+ BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
(
1− tR − tR 1−tRBR
∂BR
∂tR
∣∣∣
nR const
)
− C ′
=
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
eφ+ BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
tRe+ C
′
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
(1− tN(1 + eφ)) + BR1−tR
∂tR
∂t
(1− tR(1 + e))− C ′
where in the last line, we have used (32).So, dividing top and bottom of (A.15) by BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
+
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
and using the definition of θ from (34), and the definition of C from (37), we get
MEB =
(1− θ)tNeφ+ θtRe+ C
1− (1− θ)tN(1 + eφ)− θtR(1 + e)− C (A.16)
Finally, using the definitions of τ = (1 − θ)tN + θtR, ε = (1−θ)tNφ+θtR(1−θ)tN+θtR e, (A.16) can be
rearranged to (36), as required. 
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Online Appendix
Details of MEB Simulation for the VAT Case. We need to express all the relevant
elements of the MEB in terms of the parameters, t, γ, z0,and nR, nN . In turn, we know
that nN = z0/(1− tN)e and that nR is determined by
(1− tN)z0(1 + e)− e(nR)−1/e (z0)1+
1
e − nR(1− tR)1+e = 0 (N.1)
Assume that the distribution of firms is Pareto with shape and scale parameters a, n.
Without loss of generality, we assume n = 1; so, the distribution and density of n isH(n) =
1 − n−a, h(n) = a
na+1
. So, using these formulae and z(1 − t;n) = (1 − t)en, we have by
routine calculation;
BR = (1− tR)e
ˆ n
nR
nh(n)dn = (1− tR)e a
a− 1(nR)
1−a (N.2)
BN = (1− tN)e
ˆ nN
1
nh(n)dn+ z0(H(nR)−H(nN))
= (1− tN)e a
a− 1(1− (nN)
1−a) + z0
(
(nN)
−a − (nR)−a
)
Moreover, from the formulae for tN , tR in the paper, we have:
∂tR
∂t
=
1
(1− γ)(1 + t)2 ,
∂tR
∂t
=
γ
(1− γ) (N.3)
So, plugging (N.3) into the formula for θ in the paper, we can write
θ =
BR
1−tR
BR
1−tR +
BN
1−tN γ(1 + t)
2
(N.4)
Plugging (N.2) into (N.5) allows us to compute θ as a function of t, γ, z0,and nN , nR.
Next, using z(1 − t;n) = (1 − t)en, and the properties of the Pareto distribution, we
have;
φ =
´ nN
n
z(1− tN ;n)h(n)dn
BN
=
(1− tN)e aa−1(1− (nN)1−a)
BN
(N.5)
So, using (N.2), (N.5), φ can be computed as a function of t, γ, z0,and nN , nR.
Finally, recalling the definition of C in the paper, we have:
C = −
∂R
∂nR
(
∂tN
∂t
∂nR
∂tN
+ ∂tR
∂t
∂nR
∂tR
)
BN
1−tN
∂tN
∂t
+ BR
1−tR
∂tR
∂t
(N.6)
= −
∂R
∂nR
(
γ ∂nR
∂tN
+ 1
(1+t)2
∂nR
∂tR
)
BN
1−tN γ +
BR
1−tR
1
(1+t)2
where in the second line, we use (N.3).
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It remains to calculate ∂nR
∂tN
, ∂nR
∂tR
, ∂R
∂nR
. From (N.1), we have:
∂nR
∂tR
=
(1− tR)enR(1 + e)
(1− tR)1+e −
(
z0
nR
)1+1/e (N.7)
∂nR
∂tN
=
−z0(1 + e)
(1− tR)1+e −
(
z0
nR
)1+1/e
Moreover, from the formula for ∂R
∂nR
in the paper, and the iso-elastic form of z(1 − t, n),
we get
∂R
∂nR
= (tNz0 − tR(1− tR)enR)h(nR) (N.8)
Plugging (N.7),(N.8) into (N.6), and using the formula for the density of the Pareto
density to substitute out h(nR), we eventually get:
C =
(tR(1− tR)enR − tNz0)
(
(1− tR)enR 1(1+t)2 − z0γ
)
(1 + e)(
(1− tR)1+e −
(
z0
nR
)1+1/e)(
BR
1−tR
1
(1+t)2
+ BN
1−tN γ
) a(nR)a+1
This expression for C is computable knowing t, γ, z0,and nR, nL. Thus, all the components
of MEB in the paper can be calculated. 
Calculation of the Pareto Parameter for UK firms. We use the method of Luttmer
(2007) and others to estimate the distribution of of firm size for the UK using corporate
tax return data. Firm size y is measured by sales. If the distribution of firm size is Pareto,
the log of the size of the upper tail of the distribution of firm size is linear in y, with the
coefficient on y being a.
We briefly describe the the data here: a fuller description is given in Liu and Lock-
wood (2015). We have annual sales of firms, taken from the universe of corporation tax
records (CT600) in financial years 2004/5 to 2009/10. The data is then refined by elim-
inating companies which are part of a larger VAT group i.e. using only standard-alone
independent companies. We also drop all observations with partial-year corporation tax
records. In addition, we eliminate companies that mainly engage in overseas activities.
This yields a data-set with 731,706 observations for 435,688 companies between April 1,
2004 and March 30, 2010.
To analyze the data, we group firm sales into bins of size £10,000. A visual inspection
of the data (available on request) indicates that log of the size of the upper tail of the
distribution of firm size is near to linear in y. We then regress (by year) the size of the
upper tail of the distribution, denoted 1−F , on firm size as measured by sales. We define
the upper tail as starting at the VAT threshold in any year. The coefficient on sales in
this regression gives a value for a. Inspection of the results in Table 1 below indicates
that for our population of UK firms, a is approximately 1.2.
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Table 1: Regression of Upper Tail of the Size Distribution on Firm Size
Dependent Variable: log of 1-F
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Sales -1.202*** -1.182*** -1.180*** -1.202*** -1.193*** -1.182***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 3.353*** 3.192*** 3.285*** 3.413*** 3.344*** 3.133***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026)
R-squared 0.975 0.977 0.975 0.971 0.974 0.979
N 2119 2185 2336 2349 2421 2334
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